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2Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the dependency of the benefits of health improvements on
comorbid conditions.  We find that under plausible conditions regarding the utility function
over wealth and health, the willingness to pay for health improvements increases with the
severity of the comorbid conditions.  This positive relationship between willingness to pay
and severity of comorbid conditions has implications both for the empirical elicitation of
willingness to pay measures and for applications of cost benefit analysis in health policy.
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3Many social scientists express doubts about the relevance of cost benefit analyses (CBA) in
the field of health because the willingness to pay concept which is at the root of the
measurement of benefits tends to favor young patients at the expense of old ones.
Although this suspicion is to a wide extent justified, we show in this paper that it needs to be
qualified once comorbidities are taken into consideration.  We essentially obtain that under
plausible assumptions the existence of health problems other than those of the index condition
that is being treated do increase the monetary benefit attached to the treatment.  Since old
people are also more likely to face multiple health troubles, the positive effect of
comorbidities on the treatment value will to some extent compensate for the negative impact
of age.
Surprisingly the topics of comorbidities is very new in health economics.  In a quite recent
contribution, HARRIS R. and R. NEASE (1997) (henceforth H-N) have pointed out that
many cost-effectiveness studies in the field of health have neglected to « account for the
morbid conditions that patients experience other than the index condition being studied ».  In
their note they show how comorbid conditions affect the estimation of the number of quality
adjusted life years (QALY’s) gained from a therapeutic decision.  Their main conclusion is
that « analyses that ignore comorbidities overstate an intervention’s health benefit relative to
analyses that do account for comorbidities ».
H-N have raised an important question that was too often neglected both in theoretical and
applied studies.  The purpose of the present paper is to extend their contribution in two
directions.
First, instead of looking at the impact of comorbidities for cost-effectiveness studies (hence
H-N’s interest in QALY’s) we consider their impact on willingness to pay measures which
are more directly relevant for cost-benefit analyses.  Examining W.T.P. forces us to introduce
a two dimensional utility function (of health and of wealth) which raises specific technical
difficulties not present in H-N’s paper.
Second, while H-N consider only existing comorbidities, we also examine the impact of
potential comorbidities that might develop in the future along with the evolution of the index
condition being studied.  In this way we create a bridge with the recent economics literature
on background risks as applied to saving or insurance decisions [KIMBALL (1990),
EECKHOUDT-KIMBALL (1992)].  We generalize the latter approach by studying the
impact of background risks in decision problems involving two-dimensional utility functions.
The paper is organized as follows.  The general model is presented in section 1.  We consider
the willingness to pay (W.T.P.) of a patient for improvements in his health conditions towards
a specific illness (the « index condition ») while he may or may not also develop another
illness (the « comorbidity risk »).
In section 2, we analyze the properties of two W.T.P. concepts1 with regard to the severity of
the comorbid condition, assuming – as in H-N – that this condition is present with certainty.
Section 3 extends the analysis to the case of a random comorbidity while in section 4 attention
is paid to the impact of mean preserving changes in risk related to the comorbid condition.
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 The two concepts are the W.T.P. to reduce the probability of occurrence of the index condition and the W.T.P.
to reduce the severity of the index condition if it were to occur (see below).
4Our main conclusion, presented in section 5, is that the impact of comorbidity on W.T.P.
critically depends upon properties of the two dimensional utility function (of wealth and
health) that is used to define W.T.P.  Under the most plausible assumptions, comorbidity
increases W.T.P. for actions that improve the patient’s position towards the index condition.
Thus analyses that fail to consider comorbidity underestimate W.T.P.  This result is important
for cost-benefit analysis  For instance it is often claimed that because W.T.P. falls with age,
application of cost-benefit analysis would lead to health policies that are detrimental for old
people.  However, in a recent study of comorbidity factors among unselected cancer patients
in the Netherlands over the period 93-96, J.W.W. COEBERGH et al (1999) found that
comorbid conditions were present in 12% of adult cancer patients below 45 years of age, 28%
of those 45-59 years, 53% of those 60-74 years and 63% of patients over 75 years of age.
Hence there is clearly an increase of comorbidity risk with age and thus consideration of
comorbidity in CBA compensates at least partially for the age effect.
1. The general model
We consider an individual who derives utility from his wealth (W) and his health (H), so that
U U(W, H)= (1.1)
We adopt for U standard assumptions :
− 1U  and 2U , the marginal utilities with respect to each argument are strictly
positive ;
− 11U  and 22U  are negative so that the individual is risk averse towards a single
risk on each argument of U ;
− 12U  the cross second derivative of U is assumed non negative (quote references).
Further assumptions on higher order derivatives will be made when necessary.
Full health which is denoted 0H  is threatened by two illnesses (1 and 2) the severities of
which are denoted respectively 1M  and 2M .  The probabilities of occurrence are 1p  and 2p
and the two risks are independent.  Consequently there are four possible states of the world :
0H  with probability ( )( )1 21 p 1 p− −
0 1H M−  with probability ( )1 2p 1 p−
(1.2)
0 2H M−  with probability ( )1 21 p p−
0 1 2H M M− −  with probability 1 2p p
Implicit in (1.2) is the assumption that the severities are additive when the two diseases occur
simultaneously.
In this framework, the patient’s initial expected utility is :
5[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 0 1 2 1 2 0 1E U p p U W, H M M p 1 p U W,H M= − − + − −
          ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 0 2 1 2 01 p p U W,H M 1 p 1 p U W,H+ − − + − − (1.3)
For notational convenience, we define :
12 0 1 2H H M M≡ − −
1 0 1H H M≡ −
2 0 2H H M≡ −
In the rest of the paper disease 1 will be the index condition and disease 2 the comorbid one.
Given (1.3) two W.T.P. concepts can be developed for the index condition :
− how much wealth is the patient willing to give up in oder to reduce 1p  from its
baseline level ;
− how much wealth is the patient willing to give up in order to reduce the severity of
illness 1 ( )1M  from its baseline level.
Formal expressions for these two W.T.P. concepts can be obtained by differentiating (1.3)
with respect to 1p  and 1M , to yield
2
 :
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 12 2 1 2 2 2 0
1 1 2 1 12 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 0
p U W, H 1 p U W, H p U W,H 1 p U W,HdW
dp p p U W, H 1 p U W, H 1 p p U W, H 1 p U W, H
− + − + + −      
=
+ − + − + −      
(1.4)
        
M
N
=  for short
Notice that : M 0>  because 2U 0>
N 0>   because 1U 0>
so that 
1
dW
dp
 is positive : an increase in 1p  should be compensated for by an increase in W.
Similarly,
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 2 12 2 2 1
1
p p U W, H 1 p U W,HdW
dM N
+ −  
= (1.5)
                                 
ˆM
N
=  for notational convenience
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 The detailed procedure is illustrated in appendix 1 for the case of a change in 1p .  Let us also notice that the
W.T.P. concept was defined in different ways in the literature.  For instance, using an indirect utility function,
P.O. JOHANSSON (1995) defines a « W.T.P. locus » (see especially his chapter 4 « Money measures in a risky
world »).  An interesting presentation can also be found in ZWEIFEL P. and F. BREYER (1997), especially in
chapter 2, section 2.3 « Monetary evaluation of the length of life ».
6ˆM  being positive, an increase in 1M  must be compensated for by an increase in W.  In fact
1
dW
dM
 measures willingness to pay to reduce the severity of illness 1 while 
1
dW
dp
 measures
W.T.P. to reduce the probability of illness 1.  Although a fall in 1p  or in 1M  represent each a
first-order stochastic-dominant (F.S.D.) improvement in the patient’s health3 they induce
different W.T.P.’s.
Quite interestingly, if 2M 0=  or if 2p 0=  and if 1H  stands for death, then (1.4) reduces to
the value of a statistical life (VSL) concept developed by DREZE (1962) and JONES-LEE
(1974) (as well as many others thereafter) who considered W.T.P. for a reduction in the
probability of death in the absence of any other risk4.  Indeed for 2M 0=  and 2p 1=  (1.4)
becomes :
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0
U W,H U W, HdW
dp p U W,H 1 p U H
− +
=
+ −
(1.6)
Taking 1H  as the state of death (disease 1 implying death) and 0H  as the state of life then the
transformation of (1.4) into (1.6) leads to the VSL concept.  The severity element which is
important only in the present model is irrelevant in the literature on the VSL because attention
is focused only on the probability of death.
Let us also mention that a model similar to that presented in (1.3) was already developed by
VISCUSI K., W. MAGAT and J. HUBER as early as in 1987 (see also more recently
O’CONOR and BLOMQUIST (1997)).  However the questions these authors raised were to a
wide extent different from those analyzed here.  Besides some theoretical concepts (such as
that of prudence used here [see below]) were not known at the time the VISCUSI et al paper
was written.
In the next two sections we examine the impact of comorbidity (disease 2) on the two W.T.P.
concepts defined in (1.4) and (1.5).  We proceed in two steps.  First, as in H-N, we assume
that comorbidity is already present for sure when improvements towards the index condition
(disease 1) are being considered.  This amounts to using 2p 1=  while 2M  is strictly positive.
In the next section and in complement to H-N’s analysis, we consider that the comorbid
condition is also random ( )2 20 p 1 and M 0< < > .  In each section we wonder how and in
which direction the comorbidity affects each W.T.P. which is an important ingredient for any
cost-benefit analysis (see e.g. PAULY M. (1995)).
                                                
3
 F.S.D. improvements are changes in the density of a random variables that are unanimously approved by all
decision makers with an increasing utility function.  Of course all patients who prefer more health to less are
unanimous to like either a fall in 1p  or a decrease in severity.
4
 For the sake of completeness let us mention however that in a recent paper L. EECKHOUDT and J.
HAMMITT investigate the impact of background risks on the value of a statistical life (VSL).
72. Comorbidity for certain
Let us now turn to the case where comorbidity is certain, i.e. the patient has disease 2 for sure.
Note that this means that the index condition and the comorbid one are not treated
symmetrically : while disease 1 is only potential, disease 2 is always present.  We derive the
impact of the introduction of the comorbidity on the two W.T.P. concepts defined in section 1.
That is, we examine the impact of the introduction of the comorbidity on the W.T.P. for
actions that reduce 1p  or 1M .
When disease 2 is certain, (1.4) and (1.5) become much simpler and can be written as :
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
’
12 2
’1 1 1 12 1 1 2
U W, H U W, HdW M
dp p U W, H 1 p U W,H N
− +
= =
+ −
(2.1)
and
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
"
1 2 12
’1 1 1 12 1 1 2
p U W,HdW M
dM p U W, H 1 p U W,H N
= =
+ −
(2.2)
where ’ "M , M  and ’N  are positive numbers.
To express the impact of 2M  on each of these expressions, we differentiate (2.1) and (2.2)
with respect to 2M  and we obtain :
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
’ ’
2 12 2 2 1 12 12 1 12 2
2
’2 1
N . U W,H U W,H M p U W, H 1 p U W,HdW
M dp N
− − − − − ∂
= ∂  
(2.3)
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
’ "
1 22 12 1 12 12 1 12 2
2
’2 1
N p U W, H M p U W, H 1 p U W, HdW
M dM N
− − − − − ∂
= ∂   (2.4)
Because 22U 0< , the sign of (2.3) and (2.4) depends critically on that of 12U .  Given our
assumption that 12U 0> , both 
2 1
dW
M dp
 ∂  ∂    and 2 1
dW
M dM
 ∂  ∂    are positive (note that this also
holds if 12U 0= ).  Ceteris paribus, an increase in the severity of the comorbid condition
increases both the W.T.P. for a reduction in 1p  and the W.T.P. for a reduction in 1M .  Hence,
ignoring the comorbid condition in cost benefit analysis leads to an underestimation of the
benefit of an intervention regarding the index condition under the plausible assumption of
nonnegative 12U .
The above conclusion is the opposite of that of HARRIS and NEASE (1997).  This follows
because H-N’s model is one-dimensional, containing only health effects, while our model is
two-dimensional and considers interactions between health and wealth
83. Random comorbidity
Suppose now that disease 2 is also random.  We wonder how changes in either its likelihood
( )2p  or its severity ( )2M  affect each of the two W.T.P. concepts.  Hence we have to
examine four partial derivatives obtained by differentiating (1.4) and (1.5) each with respect
to 2p  and 2M .  For instance we have :
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )12 1 2 0
2 1
N U H U H U H U HdW
p dp
 
− − + − ∂  
= ∂  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 12 1 1 1 1 2 1 0
2
M p U H U H 1 p U H U H
N
 
− − + − −  (3.1)
where for notational convenience U(W,H) was replaced by U(H) since W is the same in each
expression.
Consider first the term ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )12 1 2 0U H U H U H U H R− − + − = .  Because
1 12 0 2H H H H− = −  and 0 1H H>  it follows by risk aversion with respect to health that R is
strictly positive.  Figure 1 illustrates this claim.  Concavity of U in H implies that
( ) ( )( )1 12ba U H U H= −  exceeds ( ) ( )( )0 2dc U H U H= − .
                        U
                                                                                                               d
                                                                                                                 c
                                               b
                                                  a
                                    2M                                                         2M
                            12H             1H                                      2H               0H                              H
Figure 1 : Illustration that R is strictly positive
9Let us now turn to the sign of the term
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 12 1 1 1 1 2 1 0p U H U H 1 p U H U H S − + − − =  .  Because 1 12 0 2H H ,H H> > ,
and since we have assumed that 12U 0> , it follows that S is strictly negative and thus the
term M *S−  is strictly positive.  Hence, (3.1) consists of two strictly positive terms and thus
the relationship between changes in 2p  and changes in 
1
dW
dp
 is positive.  If the probability of
the comorbid increases, the patient is willing to pay more to reduce the probability of getting
disease 1.  Note that this conclusion also holds true if either 22U 0=  (risk neutrality) and
12 22U 0 or U 0> <  and 12U 0=  (no interdependence between the utility of health and the
utility of wealth).  In the first case, R = 0 and hence N*R = 0, but S < 0 and thus –M*S > 0.
Consequently, the sign of 
2 1
dW
p dp
 ∂  ∂    remains strictly positive.  In the second case, S = 0 and
thus –M*S = 0, but N*R remains strictly positive by risk aversion and thus the sign of
2 1
dW
p dp
 ∂  ∂    remains strictly positive.
Similar arguments as those applied to 
2 1
dW
p dp
 ∂  ∂    show that 2 1
dW
M dp
 ∂  ∂   , 2 1
dW
p dM
 ∂  ∂    and
2 1
dW
M dM
 ∂  ∂    are also strictly positive under 22U 0<  and 12U 0≥  or 22U 0=  and 12U 0>
5
.
The above analysis shows that the risks tend to reinforce each other.  When the comorbid
conditions deteriorate the patient is willing to pay more to improve the index condition.  Quite
interestingly this result holds true even if 12U 0=  that is when health and wealth are « utility
independent ».
Finally observe that the results in Sections 2 and 3 are qualitatively equivalent.  In fact,
Section 2 can now be viewed as a special case of Section 3 with 2p  equal to unity.
4. A mean preserving change in risk for the comorbid condition
In the previous sections, we have considered changes in the comorbid conditions that would
always increase its expected severity.  Indeed when 2p  or 2M  increase, 2p . 2M  is also
necessarily increasing.  In fact changes in 2p  or in 2M  determine shifts in risk which are of a
first order stochastic dominance nature (see fn 3 below for a definition).
We now turn to the impact of a joint change in 2p  and in 2M  such that expected severity
( 2p . 2M ) remains constant.  If 2p  falls while 2M  increases with 2p 2M  constant it is said
that the comorbid condition becomes riskier6 while its mean is preserved.
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 The proof which is easy but tedious can be obtained from the authors.
6
 In a more recent terminology one might say that the comorbidity condition becomes « catastrophic ».  See
ZECKHAUSER (1995) for a definition.
10
We illustrate in details the impact of a mean preserving increase in risk (M.P.I.R.) for the
comorbid condition on W.T.P. for a reduced probability of the index condition.  A similar
analysis with the same type of conclusions7 can be reached as far as the W.T.P. for a reduced
severity is concerned.
To determine the impact of a M.P.I.R. on W.T.P., we differentiate (1.4) with respect to 2p
and 2M  keeping in mind that 2p 2M  is constant so that :
2 2
2 2
dM M
dp p
= − (4.1)
We obtain
t t2 2p M C p M C2 2 2 2
2t2 1 p M C2 2
M NN . M .
p pd dW
dp dp N
= =
=
∂ ∂
−∂ ∂ 
=   (4.2)
where tC  denotes « constant ».
Besides
( ) ( ) ( ) 212 1 2 2 12
t2 2p M C2 2
M MU W, H U W, H p U W,H .
p p
=
 ∂
= − − + ∂  
( ) ( ) ( ) 22 0 2 2 2
2
MU W,H U W, H p U W,H .
p
 
+ − +  
(4.3)
and
( ) ( ) ( ) 21 1 12 1 1 2 12 12
t2 2p M C2 2
N Mp U W,H U W,H p U W,H .
p p
=
 ∂
= − + ∂  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 21 1 2 1 0 2 12 2
2
M1 p U W,H U W,H p U W,H .
p
 
+ − − +  
(4.4)
Given our assumption of risk aversion, i.e., 22U 0< , we show in Appendix 2 that the sign of
t2 p M C2 2
M
p
=
∂
∂
 is negatively related to that of 222U .  We also show that given 12U 0> , the
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 Available from the authors upon request.
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sign of 
t2 p M C2 2
N
p
=
∂
∂
 is negatively related to the sign of 122U .  Hence, the impact of a mean
preserving increase in the comorbidity risk on the W.T.P. for reductions in 1p  depends on the
signs of 222U  and 122U .  If 222U 0>  and 122U 0<  then a mean preserving increase in the
comorbidity risk increases the W.T.P. for a reduction in the probability of the index
condition8.
We observe that the impact of a mean preserving increase in risk on the W.T.P. depends not
only on conditions regarding the second order derivatives of U, but also on conditions
regarding the third order derivatives.  The third order derivatives may appear unintuitive.
However, they can be given an interpretation in terms of actual behavior.  Let us start with
222 222U . U 0>  implies that the people are prudent with respect to health.  The notion of
prudence was first proposed by KIMBALL (1990) in a model of saving under income risk
where he built upon partial results obtained in the same context by LELAND (1968) and
SANDMO (1970).  In that context, prudence means that people will increase their saving
today to forearm themselves against future income risk.  KIMBALL has shown taht if 222U
is strictly positive then people will save more when future income risk increases.  In the
context of our model, 222U 0>  means that people would like to increase their expected
health stock (e.g. by spending more on treatment) if it were to become more random (see
Appendix 3).
122U  is related to the sensitivity of a patient’s attitude regarding health risks to changes in
wealth.  Indeed the latter is equal to :
22
2 122 2 22 12
2
2
U
U U U U U
W U
 ∂ − 
− 
= −
∂
 (4.5)
122U 0<  is a necessary condition for the patient to become less averse to health risks when
his wealth increases.
5. Conclusion
We have shown that a patient’s willingness to pay for improvements in his index condition
increases with the severity of his comorbid conditions.  In most of the cases we examined this
positive relationship depends on risk aversion regarding health risks and on positive
interdependence between the utility of wealth and the utility of health, assumptions that are
plausible and that have been supported in empirical studies.  In the case of a mean preserving
increase in risk, additional assumptions regarding the third derivatives of the utility function
for health and wealth must be invoked.  These assumptions seem reasonable, but have not
been tested empirically.  Testing these assumptions is a topic for future research.
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 To be complete, this also holds if either 222 122U or U  is zero and even if either 22 12U or U  is zero.
12
Our analysis emphasizes the importance of incorporating information on comorbidities in the
elicitation of willingness to pay measures.  Without this information, willingness to pay
measures are likely to be biased downwards.  Our analysis also has important implications for
health policy.  For instance, cost-benefit analysis is often said to discriminate against the
elderly who are supposed to derive less benefit from prolonged longevity.  This argument
should be qualified if – as is plausible – age positively covaries with the severity of the
comorbidities.
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